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I. INTRODUCTION
While only ninety miles of ocean separate Cuba from the
United States, since the Castro regime took control of Cuba in
1959, the two countries have squared off with economic sanctions
and a perpetual war of words. Though however frayed the rela-
tions have been, each nation had a track-record of setting politics
aside when it came to recognizing intellectual property rights.' In
fact, more than 5,000 trademarks have been registered by more
than 400 U.S. companies in Cuba.2 Since the first U.S. mark was
registered in 1918 by Aunt Jemima,3 many U.S. companies have
hired local counsel in Cuba to ensure that their marks are prop-
erly registered and renewed.4 The United States has also consist-
ently allowed Cuba to register and renew marks in the United
States.' That is, until 2006.
In June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an
appeal in a trademark case pitting a Cuban company, Empresa
Cubana del Tabaco (Cubatabaco), against American-based Gen-
eral Cigar Company.6 In doing so, the Supreme Court let stand a
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision finding that the U.S.-
Cuban embargo prevented a transfer of property rights in the
Cohiba mark to Cubatabaco.7 Just months after the Supreme
Court dealt a blow to the Cuban-government owned Cubatabaco,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) stripped
Cubaexport, a Cuban government owned company, of its rights to
1. See Matthew Haggman, Trouble with Trademarks: Bacardi's Victory in the
Havana Club Trademark Fight Could Spell Trouble for Many Other U.S. Businesses,
MiAMi HERALD, Aug. 20, 2006, at El.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See Larry Luxner, Trademark Registration a Lucrative Business for Lex S.A.,
CUBA NEWS, May 1, 2003.
5. See Cuba Pushes For Section 211 Repeal, USTR Remains Neutral on
Approach, INSIDE US TRADE, July 16, 2004, § 29. The chief of the Cuban Interests
Section in the United States noted in a letter to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
that "both countries have 'traditionally cooperated' in the registration and
enforcement of each other's trademark rights, and noted that 'thousands of U.S.
trademarks' have been registered and protected in Cuban courts." Id.
6. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2887 (2006).
7. See Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 471.
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the Havana Club trademark.8 In August 2006, the PTO denied
Cubaexport's renewal registration by classifying their registration
as "canceled/expired," representing the latest salvo in the decade-
long battle over the Havana Club mark.9 Prior to the August deci-
sion, the long-running and emotion laden 'Rum War' had already
weaved its way through all three braches of the U.S. govern-
ment,"° the World Trade Organization (WTO),"I and had even
landed the prevailing party, Bacardi, a criminal indictment.1 2
For decades the United States has recognized, through trea-
ties 3 and statutes,14 that intellectual property rights are funda-
mental. The Havana Club and Cohiba disputes have undermined
this notion. While the intellectual property issues addressed in
these cases were quite different, their resolutions have a clear
underlying similarity: neither case decided the merits of the intel-
lectual property principles raised. 5 Instead, both were disposed of
on the basis that the intellectual property involved had a nexus
with the Cuban government. 6
This comment will first explore the history of the Cohiba and
Havana Club disputes and how U.S. foreign policy served as the
basis for the respective courts' decisions. Additionally, the effec-
tive efforts undertaken to pre-determine the judicial outcome of
the Havana Club case will be examined, along with the interna-
tional response those efforts provoked. Then, the significance of
how the Cohiba and Havana Club disputes were resolved will be
8. See Haggman, supra note 1.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See WTO, Appellate Body Report, United States - Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, 281-96, U.N. Doc. WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report], available at http://www.worldtradelaw.netl
reports/wtoab/us-section21l(ab).pdf.
12. See Scott Gold, Deals Reached in Texas Political Donation Inquiry, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2005, at 12.
13. See generally E. Brooke Brinkerhoff, International Protection of U.S.
Trademarks: A Survey of Major International Treaties, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus
109 (2001) (providing an overview of international treaties relevant to trademark
law).
14. See Brandon Barker, The Power of the Well-Known Trademark: Courts Should
Consider Article 6BIS of the Paris Convention an Integrated Part of Section 44 of the
Lanham Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 363 (2006) ("With the passage of the Lanham Act in
1946, Congress effectively codified federal trademark law and provided the sole
statutory means by which trademark owners can assert their substantive rights in
federal courts.").
15. See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005);
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2nd Cir. 2000).
16. See Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 465.; Havana Club, 203 F.3d at 119.
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discussed. In considering their resolutions, it will be asserted that
these cases reveal that a 'carve-out' in intellectual property law
has developed for disputes with a Cuban nexus.
The comment will then study the effects on intellectual prop-
erty law, should it become a body of law subject to numerous, bur-
densome 'carve-outs.' In evaluating the consequences of such
'carve-outs,' it will be argued that the ramifications could under-
mine the purpose of trademark law, create complications for U.S.
corporations that have invested in building their worldwide
brands, and diminish U.S. credibility on the global stage. The
political underpinnings of the Cuban 'carve out' will also be con-
sidered, as they are inconsistent with the role politics has tradi-
tionally played in intellectually property law. Ultimately, it will
be concluded that the Cuban 'carve out,' as revealed by the Cohiba
and Havana Club disputes, should prompt the intellectual prop-
erty community to reconsider the wisdom of ceding a fair and doc-
trinally-based set of legal principles to the ever-evolving foreign
policy arena. Otherwise, many U.S. companies could find their
own intellectual property rights "on the rocks."
II. U.S. EMBARGO ON CUBA: CUBATABACO'S TRADEMARK
CLAIMS Go UP IN SMOKE
A. Background: The Cuban Cohiba vs. the Dominican
Cohiba
For more than forty years Empresa Cubana del Tabaco
(Cubatabaco) has produced Cohiba cigars, 7 generally considered
to be one of the most high-quality, premium cigars available.'"
Though throughout its long history, the Cuban company had
never sought to register its mark in the United States. 9 After all,
the company was prevented from selling its cigars in America due
to the longstanding U.S. economic embargo on Cuban goods.20
American-based General Cigar Co. sought to capitalize on the
Cuban company's failure to register the Cohiba mark.2' In 1981,
17. See Nick Foulkes, The Puff Daddy, MAML ON SUNDAY, Aug. 20, 2006, at 35 (on
file with author).
18. See id. ("Today, the black-and-yellow band of the Cohiba is as much a part of
the millionaires' milieu as the prancing horse of Ferrari or the clear glass bottle of
Louis Roederer Cristal.").
19. See Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 465.
20. See id.
21. See Doreen Hemlock, High Court Rejects Cohiba Challenge, SUN-SENTINEL,
June 20, 2006, at 1D.
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the American company registered the Cohiba brand in the United
States and subsequently began to sell its own Dominican pro-
duced cigars under the Cohiba label.22 However, when the cigar
failed to catch-on in the United States, General Cigar chose not to
renew its registration of the Cohiba mark.23 A decade later, how-
ever, the cigar market underwent a considerable change, and sud-
denly the Cohiba label became a 'must smoke' for cigar
aficionados.24 In 1992, a series of press articles brought the Cuban
Cohiba great acclaim, including a September feature in Cigar Afi-
cionado magazine "extoll[ing] the wonders of the Cuban Cohiba."25
As the popularity of the Cohiba grew, General Cigar again regis-
tered the Cohiba mark in December 1992.26
After registering the mark for a second time without opposi-
tion, General Cigar in 1997 launched a new Cohiba cigar cam-
paign seeking to capitalize on the media attention that the Cuban
Cohiba had received since 1992.27 This prompted Cubatabaco to
seek redress from both the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, as
well as the courts. Cubatabaco claimed that it owned the Cohiba
mark "because General Cigar abandoned its .. .registration in
1987, and that, by the time General Cigar resumed use of the
mark in 1992, the Cuban Cohiba mark was sufficiently well
known in the United States that it deserved protection under the
so-called 'famous marks doctrine.' 29
B. U.S. Embargo on Cuba Precludes Judgment of the
Merits
After considering the merits of Cubatabaco's claims, the Dis-
22. See id.
23. Frances Robles, U.S. Supreme Court: Cuba Loses Fight to Competitor Over its
Trademark Cigar, MIAMI HERALD, June 21, 2006, at A9 ("But cigar sales were
lackluster back then, and the company did little with the famed name.").
24. See id.
25. Id.; see also Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 466.
26. See Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 466 (The Court of Appeals quoted the lower
court's finding that General Cigar "'acknowledges that the reintroduction was at
least in part a response to Cigar Aficionado's coverage of the Cuban Cohiba"').
27. See id. ("The District Court noted that '[t]he 1997 advertising for the General
Cigar 'Cohiba' attempted to create an association in the consumer's mind to Cuba and
the Cuban Cohiba."').
28. See id.; see also Hemlock, supra note 21 (noting that Cubatabaco had
previously registered the Cohiba brand in "115 other countries and sells the brand
worldwide, except in the United States").
29. Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 464.
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trict Court sided with the Cuban entity.3" The court permanently
enjoined General Cigar from using the Cohiba mark and ordered
its registration be cancelled.3 1 The trial court's rationale was
rooted in both the 'priority of use' 32 and the 'famous mark' doc-
trines. While courts have taken different views as to whether
U.S. statute34 authorizes a foreign entity to seek trademark pro-
tection under the 'famous marks' doctrine," the Second Circuit
chose not to address that question when reviewing the trial court's
decision. 6 Instead, the appellate court focused on an argument
which had not even been put forward by General Cigar,37 stating
that this case "implicates an issue of significant public concern-
the United States' national policy towards Cuba as established by
the President and the Congress-and it involves a question of
pure law."3s The court further found that awarding Cubatabaco
an injunction preventing General Cigar from using the Cohiba
mark would "... entail a transfer of property rights in the Cohiba
mark to Cubatabaco in violation of the embargo."39
The U.S.-Cuba embargo, as codified in the Cuban Assets Con-
trol Regulations, states:
(b) All of the following transactions are prohibited, except
as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury
(or any person, agency, or instrumentality designated by
him) by means of regulations, rulings, instructions,
licenses, or otherwise, if such transactions involve property
in which any foreign country designated under this part, or
any national thereof, has at any time on or since the effec-
tive date of this section had any interest of any nature
whatsoever, direct or indirect:
30. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399(RWS), 2004
WL 602295, at *52 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2004).
31. See id.
32. See id. at *30.
33. See id. at *52.
34. See False Designations of Origin, False Descriptions, and Dilution Forbidden,
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (2006).
35. See Barker, supra note 14, at 379.
36. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 471 (2d Cir.
2005) ("We do not reach the question of whether to recognize the famous marks
doctrine because even if a foreign entity can, as a general matter, acquire trademark
rights in the United States through the famous marks doctrine, Cubatabaco's
acquisition rights in this manner is barred by the embargo.").
37. See id. (noting that "[a]lthough General Cigar did not raise this argument
below, we consider it on appeal .... ").
38. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360-61
(11th Cir. 1984)).
39. Id.
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(1) All dealings in, including, without limitation, trans-
fers, withdrawals, or exportations of, any property or evi-
dences of indebtedness or evidences of ownership of
property by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States; and
(2) All transfers outside the United States with regard
to any property or property interest subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States.
(c) Any transaction for the purpose or which has the effect
of evading or avoiding any of the prohibitions set forth in
paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section is hereby prohibited.4 °
Given the "plain language" of the statute,41 the court found that
"'Cubatabaco's acquisition of the [Cohiba mark] ... through the
famous marks doctrine '' 42 was barred ". . . because Cubatabaco's
acquisition of the mark is a transfer of U.S. property rights from
inside the United States to Cuba .... ",43 Since Cubatabaco is a
Cuban entity, the court held ". . . that Cubatabaco's acquisition of
the U.S. Cohiba mark through the famous marks doctrine would
constitute a transfer that is prohibited ... and such transfers are
not authorized by a general or specific license. 44
The LIBERTAD Act of 1996 (Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act),4" commonly referred to as the Helms-Burton Act
after the legislation's sponsors, sought to tighten the embargo on
Cuba by placing further restrictions on property ownership,
allowing "Aihericans to sue foreign companies that use factories or
other property confiscated from Americans after the revolution...
[and] requir[ing] the State Department to deny visas to executives
of such companies and their families."4' After Europe, Canada
and Mexico became outraged, President Clinton suspended the
enforcement of many of the Act's provisions.47 Cubatabaco argued
that the 1996 Act should not be applied because it had not been in
40. Transactions Involving Designated Foreign Countries or Their Nationals;
Effective Date, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2006) (noting the effective date of this section's
application to Cuba as July 8, 1963).
41. See Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 475 (quoting amicus curiae brief submitted
on behalf of the United States).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 474.
44. Id.
45. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton
Act), Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091
(2000)).
46. See Steven Lee Myers, Europe's Call for Rights in Cuba Lets U.S. off Hook, NY
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1996, at A6.
47. See id.
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effect at the time of General Cigar's re-registration in 1992.4 The
Second Circuit declined to address that issue, stating, "[wie need
not decide whether the current version of the Regulations or the
1992 version - the version in effect at the time Cubatabaco
alleges it acquired rights to the U.S. Cohiba mark - applies."49
The LIBERTAD Act, however, was relied upon by the Second
Circuit in rejecting Cubatabaco's argument that the Paris Con-
vention, an international treaty of which the United States is a
signatory, authorized such a claim under the 'famous marks' doc-
trine.5" However, the appellate court juxtaposed the date of the
Paris Convention (1970) with that of the LIBERTAD Act, stating,
".... [a]s we have recently recalled, 'legislative acts trump treaty-
made international law' when those acts are passed subsequent to
ratification of the treaty and clearly contradict treaty obliga-
tions."5 The court further concluded, "[i]n these circumstances,
any claim grounded in the Paris Convention that presented an
irreconcilable conflict with the Regulations would be rendered
'null' by the Regulations."52
Thus, the Second Circuit's twenty-four-page ruling effectively
foreclosed all avenues for Cubatabaco to seek claim to the Cohiba
mark, due to U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. After the Supreme
Court refused to grant Cubatabaco's certiorari request,53 the com-
pany announced that it would petition the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for protection, as
that office oversees the U.S.-Cuba embargo.54 At the time of this
writing no further action had yet been taken.
III. HAVANA CLUB: LOBBYING & LEGISLATION
TRUMP JUSTICIABILITY
A. Background: Havana Club Mark's Storied Cuban
Roots
The Havana Club trademark is steeped in deep history dating
back to the turn of the twentieth century. In 1878 Jose
Arechabala founded Industrias Arechabala in his home country of
48. See Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 476.
49. See id. at 476 n.4.
50. See id. at 476-77, 481.
51. Id. at 481 (quoting United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 110 (2d Cir. 2003)).
52. Id. (citing Beard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998)).
53. See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2887 (2006).
54. See Cubatabaco to Challenge Latest Ruling on Cohiba, DUTY-FREE NEWS INT'L,
July 1, 2006, at 11.
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Cuba, where in 1934 he began producing and exporting Havana
Club rum."5 The following year, the company first registered the
brand in the United States.56 However, when the Castro regime
came to power in 1959 much of the Arechabala family fled to
Spain, 7 and the Cuban government thereafter nationalized the
company." Upon fleeing to Spain, the family was unable to re-
launch Havana Club, as their assets remained in Cuba under gov-
ernment control.59 After taking over the business, the Cuban gov-
ernment, under the company name Cubaexport, registered the
Havana Club mark in eighty countries in 1966.0 In addition,
when the Arechabala mark lapsed in 1973, the Cuban government
also registered the mark in the United States.61 All was quiet
until the 1990's, when in 1993 the Cuban government entered into
a joint-venture with Pernod Ricard, a French spirits company.62
The new venture was called Havana Club Holdings, and in 1995
the OFAC approved the Havana Club mark's transfer to the new
entity.6" That decision, however, sparked a most impassioned and
unconventional intellectual property battle.
After Havana Club Holdings was formed in 1993, the
Arechabala family was approached to buy the family's claim to
Havana Club.' While the joint-venture has sought to position
their approach as an attempt to seek indemnification through a
"nuisance fee," the family has since argued that such an offer rep-
resented an "admission that the family owns the rights."65
Whatever the case, in 1994 the Arechabala family formed an alli-
ance to market Havana Club rum with a Bacardi subsidiary.6  A
year later, Bacardi sought to have the PTO cancel Havana Club
Holding's rights to the Havana Club mark 7 and to provoke a
trademark showdown, began to distribute a Bahamas-made ver-
55. See Just-Drinks.com, What Happened When? The History of Havana Club,
Aug. 18, 2006 [hereinafter Just-Drinks.com] (on file with author).
56. See id.
57. See Julie Kay, Havana Club Patent Ruling Doesn't Go Down Smooth, MIAMI
DAILY Bus. REV., Aug. 14, 2006.
58. See Just-Drinks.com, supra note 55.
59. See Haggman, supra note 1.
60. See Just-Drinks.com, supra note 55.
61. See Kay, supra note 55.
62. See Just-Drinks.com, supra note 55.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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sion of Havana Club rum.'
Bacardi's action indeed brought the intended consequence, as
Havana Club Holdings brought suit alleging trademark infringe-
ment.69 After suit was brought in 1996,70 Bacardi took steps to
purchase the Havana Club rights from the Arechabala family in
1997. 71 That same year, the OFAC retroactively revoked Havana
Club Holdings' registration, which meant that Havana Club Hold-
ings' action could not be brought on the trademark infringement
grounds which had been plead.72 Thus, Havana Club Holdings
amended its complaint to target "Bacardi's use of the 'Havana
Club' trade name."73 However, the suit was never decided on the
trademark issues raised, as a rider attached to a 1998 omnibus
spending bill was applied retroactively and precluded a judicial
determination of the merits. 4
B. 'Bacardi Bill' Forecloses Judicial Review of the
Merits
While Havana Club Holdings was preparing to re-file its suit,
Bacardi was lobbying for legislation that would circumvent these
efforts. 75 Though Bacardi is based in Bermuda, it enlisted its
Miami-based subsidiary to persuade Florida Senator Connie Mack
to insert a provision into the 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act - Section 211,
which has become known as the 'Bacardi Bill.'76 Almost a year
after the legislation's passage, Mack's Congressional office
released a "one-line statement justifying it: 'The law covering
68. See Kay, supra note 57 ("Testing the waters, Bacardi distributed a few
hundred cases of rum in the United States under the Havana Club name in 1996.
HCH promptly sued Bacardi for trademark infringement in U.S. District Court in
New York and Bacardi pulled the product from shelves.").
69. Id.; see also Havana Club Holdings, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1085
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
70. See Kay, supra note 57.
71. See Haggman, supra note 1.
72. See Just-Drinks.com, supra note 55.
73. See id.
74. See Havana Club Holding, 62 F. Supp. 2d. at 1091, affd, 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.
2000).
75. See Ana Radelat, Cuban Plans to Produce Bacardi Rum, Patented Medicines
Could Lead to Increased Tension with the United States, CUBA NEWS, April 1, 2001.
76. See A Special-Interest Cocktail, Editorial, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at B2
[hereinafter Special Interest Cocktail] ("In 1998, then-Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott, at the request of Florida Republican Sen. Connie Mack, tacked a trade bill,
called Section 211, onto a massive appropriations bill."); see also Haggman supra note
1.
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property stolen by Fidel Castro did not apply to trademarks, and I
sought to address this deficiency and am pleased that we suc-
ceeded. ' '7 7 The measure was inserted into the 4,000 page bill
7
while it was in conference, and thus, the language was never inde-
pendently considered by either the House or Senate.79 Section 211
states:
(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no trans-
action or payment shall be authorized or approved pursu-
ant to section 515.527 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations, as in effect on September 9, 1998, with respect
to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that is the
same as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or
commercial name that was used in connection with a busi-
ness or assets that were confiscated unless the original
owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the
bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly consented.
(2) No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise vali-
date any assertion of rights by a designated national based
on common law rights or registration obtained under such
section 515.527 of such a confiscated mark, trade name, or
commercial name.
(b) No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise vali-
date any assertion of treaty rights by a designated national
or its successor-in-interest under sections 44 (b) or (e) of the
Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1126 (b) or (e)) for a
mark, trade name, or commercial name that is the same as
or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commer-
cial name that was used in connection with a business or
assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of
such mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bona
fide successor-in-interest has expressly consented.
(c) The Secretary of the Treasury shall promulgate such
rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the pro-
visions of this section.
(d) In this section: (1) The term "designated national" has
the meaning given such term in section 515.305 of title 31,
Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on September 9,
1998, and includes a national of any foreign country who is
a successor-in-interest to a designated national.
(2) The term "confiscated" has the meaning given such term
77. See Mark Fineman, Rum War Threatens to Put U.S. in Policy Bind, L.A.
TIMES, June 20, 1999.
78. See James Cox, Rum Rivals Fight Castro on U.S. Trademark Turf, USA
TODAY, Aug. 11, 1999, at lB.
79. See Special-Interest Cocktail, supra note 76.
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in section 515.336 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations,
as in effect on September 9, 1998.80
The language of Section 211 was carefully crafted in order to pre-
vent the courts from hearing the merits of the Cuban entity's
claims.81 Indeed, the linguists were successful. With no legisla-
tive history to consider, the courts were left with only the plain
meaning of the text to consider. 2
Less than a year after Section 211 was signed into law, the
district court overseeing the Havana Club dispute became the first
court to apply the statute. 3 Havana Club Holdings alleged three
claims: 1) that Bacardi's sales infringed on the Havana Club
trade name in violation of Chapter III of the General Inter-Ameri-
can Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection (IAC),
2) that Bacardi's sales infringed on their Havana Club trade name
and 3) and that Bacardi's rum is "geographically misdescriptive
because it leads consumers to erroneously believe that it
originates in Cuba."8 In addressing Havana Club's trade name
claim, the court relied upon the new language of Section 211, not-
ing "[it is well-established that Congress may pass legislation
that effectively takes away rights to which parties were previously
entitled by virtue of U.S. treaty obligations." 5 Section 211(2)(b)'s
language specifying that "[n]o U.S. court shall recognize, enforce
or otherwise validate any assertion of treaty rights by a desig-
nated national or its successor-in-interest. .. 86 foreclosed the
court from considering an important treaty, of which both the
United States and Cuba were signatories. 87 Article III of the IAC,
adopted in February 1929, was a self-executing treaty allowing a
party in any contracting state to:
... in accordance with the law and procedure of the country
where the proceeding is brought, apply for and obtain an
injunction against the use of any commercial name or the
cancellation of the registration or deposit of any trade mark
80. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 211, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
81. See Fineman, supra note 77.
82. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting in footnote five of the decision, "There is no official
legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 211.").
83. See id.
84. Id. at 1088.
85. Id. at 1091.
86. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 211(b), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
87. See Havana Club Holding, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 1091-96.
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... by proving: (a) that the commercial name or trade mark,
the enjoining or cancellation of which is desired, is identical
with or deceptively similar to his commercial name already
legally adopted and previously used in any of the Con-
tracting States, in the manufacture, sale or production of
articles of the same class .*..
The linguists who crafted Section 211 were precise, as the
statute was written to apply to any "designated national."9 This
explicitly extended the statute's application beyond a private
party in order to encompass the Cuban government's fifty-percent
ownership of Havana Club Holdings.9 ° To prevent Section 211
from being used against Bacardi, who claimed to have purchased
the rights to the Havana Club brand from the Arechabala family,
the statute also included some limiting language for trade names
that were "substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or com-
mercial name that was used in connection with a business or
assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of such
mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bona fide successor-
in-interest has expressly consented."9 Thus, the district court
noted in its decision that without the consent of the original own-
ers, Havana Club Holdings could not overcome the hurdles set
forth by Section 211 on its trade name infringement claim.2
Havana Club Holdings also claimed that the Archeabala fam-
ily had abandoned its trademark because 1) the family had never
renewed their registration and 2) the family had left the spirits-
making business altogether. 3 Some trademark experts believed
that this put Bacardi's case on "shaky legal ground."94 Section
211, however, eliminated this obstacle, as evidenced by district
88. Organization of American States, General Inter-American Convention for
Trade Mark and Commercial Protection, art. 18, Feb. 20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, 124
L.N.T.S. 357, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-7.htm.
89. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
§ 211(b).
90. See Havana Club Holding, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
91. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
§ 211(b) (emphasis added).
92. See Havana Club Holding, 62 F. Supp. 2d. at 1094 ("Because § 211 requires
that HCI obtain the consent of the original owners of the Havana Club business, and
because they do not have this consent, § 211 prevents HCI from asserting its claims
for trade name infringement.").
93. See Radelat, supra note 75.
94. See Cox, supra note 78 ("The family wrongly assumed it had to be making rum
to renew its U.S. trademark in 1973 . . .U.S. law allows applicants to register
trademarks they aren't using, as long as they can demonstrate 'excusable non-use,'
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court's decision: "The statute states that a designated national
cannot assert rights in a mark that ... was 'used in connection
with a [confiscated] business,' a requirement that is clearly met
here. The statute does not require continuous use or provide a
defense of abandonment."95
It was also asserted that Bacardi's labeling of Havana Club
rum would "deceive customers into believing that the rum is of
Cuban origin when, in fact, it is produced in the Bahamas."96 To
this claim, the court found that the U.S. embargo on Cuban goods
precluded the joint-venture from articulating any injury, and thus
Havana Club Holdings did not have standing to bring such a claim
because "they cannot satisfy the . . . requirement that they are
'likely to be damaged' by any of [Bacardi's] actions."97
In affirming the district court's decision, the appellate court
primarily relied on the U.S. embargo with Cuba." In contrast to
the analysis set forth by the district court, Section 211 was used
only to "further support its ruling."99 Perhaps conscious that fol-
lowing the district court's decision Section 211 had become the
subject of an international dispute, the appellate court used the
statute surrounding the U.S.-Cuba embargo to defeat Havana
Club's assertions that their trademark infringement claims
should be recognized under the IAC. 1°0
Article 11 of the IAC, relied upon by the court, speaks to the
issue of how Cubaexport had transferred its sole Cuban-owner-
ship of the Havana Club mark to the French-Cuban joint-ven-
ture's Havana Club Holdings.'0 ' Specifically, the court noted that
the IAC required that "[s]uch transfer shall be recorded in accor-
dance with the legislation of the country in which it is to be effec-
tive." °2 The court then found, "With respect to the Cuban
embargo, the purpose of Congress could not be more clear. Con-
gress wished to prevent any Cuban national or entity from
attracting hard currency into Cuba by selling, assigning, or other-
95. See Havana Club Holding, 62 F. Supp. 2d. at 1094 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 1096.
97. Id. at 1096.
98. See Peter J. Kaldes, Rum Wars: The Transatlantic Battle Over Section 211, 20
J.L. & COM. 261, 271 (2001).
99. See Donald R. Dinan, An Analysis of the United States-Cuba 'Havana Club'
Rum Case Before the World Trade Organization, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 337, 348
(2003).
100. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 2000)
(affirming the trial court's decision that Havana Club Holdings has no viable claim).
101. See id. at 124.
102. Id.
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wise transferring rights subject to United States jurisdiction."03
With the prior transfer invalidated due to the court's inter-
pretation of the statutes surrounding the Cuban embargo, Section
211 served as a book-end to its decision. This is because Section
211 "prohibits future assignments of expropriated trademarks
without the consent of the original owner."10 4 Thus, if Havana
Club Holdings had no right to the assignment, the appellee had no
basis for bringing a trademark infringement. In doing so, the
court "did not use Section 211 to invalidate the assignments of the
trademark to HCH, but rather as support for its interpretation. "105
In October 2000 the U.S. Supreme Court denied Havana Club
Holding's petition for a writ certiorari, though this denial did not
put to rest the issue of Section 211.06
Perhaps also anticipating the impact Section 211 would have
on the outcome of the litigation, Castro took to the street in
Havana a month prior to the district court's ruling threatening: "'I
hope no one complains if one day we begin to produce Coca-Cola
.... We might be able to make it better, and on the can we'll put:
Cuban Coca Cola."' 7 Meanwhile, Pernod-Ricard, the European-
half of the Havana Club Holdings joint-venture, had begun to
rally European Union support to bring Section 211 before the
WTO. Shortly after the district court decision was announced the
fifteen European Member States did just that.108
C. 'Bacardi Bill' Contested at the WTO
On July 7, 1999, the European Community formally took
issue with Section 211 before the WTO.109 In doing so, it was
alleged that the United States had not conformed with several
articles of the TRIPS agreement. 10 According to the WTO, "The
103. Id.
104. Peter J. Kaldes, supra note 98, at 272 (citing Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 211, 112
Stat. 2681 (1998)).
105. Id.
106. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 531 U.S. 918 (2000).
107. Tom Carter, Court Ruling Stirs Battle Over What Goes in Cuba Libre Castro
May Answer with Own Coke, WASH. TIMEs, June 17, 1999, at A16 (quoting a speech
Mr. Castro made in May 2000).
108. See Jane Bussey, EU to Challenge Bacardi's Right to Havana Club U.S. Law
at Center of Trademark Tiff, MiAMI HERALD, July 3, 1999, at 1C.
109. See WTO, Panel Report, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, U.N. Doc. WT/DS176/R at 1 (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter WTO, Panel
Report].
110. See id., §§ 4.18-4.69.
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WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS), negotiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round,
introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trad-
ing system for the first time."111 The agreement also established
how signatories are to protect trademarks specifically, by
"defin[ing] what types of signs must be eligible for protection as
trademarks, and what the minimum rights conferred on their
owners must be."1 2 Further, "[miarks that have become well-
known in a particular country enjoy additional protection."' In
its complaint, the European Union articulated twelve argu-
ments1 14 in alleging that Section 211 violated six provisions of the
TRIPS agreement." 5
The United States responded by "reject[ing] the claims of the
European Communities in their entirety." 6 Internally, however,
the U.S. Trade Representative's office seemed to have doubts, as a
leaked memo suggested.1'7 "Noting the provision was approved to
address 'a longstanding dispute between the Cuban government
and Bacardi rum,' the memo [admitted that] 'the language is prob-
lematic because it violates our obligations under the TRIPs agree-
ment."'11" Of the inconsistencies alleged by the European Union,
the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel (DSP) found that Section 211
violated a single provision of the TRIPS agreement, Article 42."1
The Panel found that under Section 211(a)(2), a potential right-
holder "is effectively prevented from having a chance to substanti-
ate its claim, a chance to which a right holder is clearly entitled
under Article 42, because effective civil judicial procedures mean
procedures with the possibility of an outcome which is not pre-
empted a priori by legislation." 2 ' In other words, Section 211
wrongly denied "access to U.S. courts for trademark holders to set-
111. WTO, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/
englishlthewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Dinan, supra note 99, at 359 ("The EU lost eleven out of twelve
arguments.").
115. See Ashley C. Adams, Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act: The
Threat to International Protection of U.S. Trademarks, 28 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG.
221, 226 (2002) (providing a summary of each of the provisions with which Section
211 was alleged to have been inconsistent).
116. See WTO, Panel Report, supra note 109, § 3.4.
117. See Jane Bussey, supra note 108.
118. Id.
119. See WTO, Panel Report, supra note 109, § 8.102.
120. Id., § 8.100.
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tle trademark disputes."''
On cross-appeals, the Appellate Body considered the Panel
Report's conclusions.122 The Appellate Body reversed the findings
of the DSP regarding Article 42 of the TRIPS agreement, but did
conclude that Section 211 was not in conformance with two other
provisions, stating:
In such a measure, that WTO Member must accord "no less
favourable treatment" to the nationals of all other WTO
Members than it accords to its own nationals, and must
grant to the nationals of all other WTO Members "any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" granted to any
other WTO Member. In such a measure, a WTO Member
may not discriminate in a way that does not respect the
obligations of national treatment and most-favoured-nation
treatment that are fundamental to the TRIPS
Agreement. 123
In doing so, the Appellate Board held that the U.S. statute "was
discriminatory because it forced Cuban nationals to undergo a
Section 211 hearing before granting them access to U.S. courts to
enforce their trademark rights, while U.S. nationals were not
required to undergo this hearing." 24 The Appellate Board applied
the same logic when determining that Section 211 was inconsis-
tent with the TRIPS agreement's most-favored-nation provision.
125
The Board agreed with the European Union that Section 211
favored "U.S. successors-in-interest to trademarks the same or
substantially similar to confiscated trademarks by exempting
them from the additional requirements imposed on Cuban and
other foreign successors-in-interest."1 26 The United States was
ordered to bring Section 211 into compliance with international
treaty agreements, and was initially given until January 3, 2003
to do so. 27 Since then, there have been several extensions, though
121. Dinan, supra note 99, at 359.
122. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, § 1.
123. Id., § 363.
124. Emily Taylor, The Havana Club Saga: Threatening More than Just "Cuba
Coke" 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 513, 521 (2004); see also Appellate Body Report,
supra note 11, §§ 275-281.
125. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, § 281; Taylor, supra note 124, at
523-24.
126. See Taylor, supra note 124, at 524; Appellate Body Report, supra note 11,
§ 281.
127. See WTO, Summary of the Dispute to Date: United States - Section 211
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, [hereinafter WTO, Summary of the Dispute],
available at http://www.wto.org/englishltratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds176_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2007).
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Section 211 remains in force. 128 While the United States has been
threatened with European trade retaliation, there has been no
realization of those threats.
D. Politics Preserves Section 211
As the WTO's examination of Section 211 played out, on the
American side of the Atlantic debate began on what to do with
what had become known as the 'Bacardi Bill."29 From 1997 (the
year prior to Section 211 becoming law) to 2003, Bacardi gave
lawmakers more than $800,000 in contributions.30 After the
WTO decision was handed down, two views emerged on how to fix
Section 211. Most, including organizations such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce,' 3 ' Citizens Against Government Waste
13 2
and the National Foreign Trade Council, 133 backed by companies
such as DaimlerChrysler, DuPont, Ford Motor Co., General
Motors, Halliburton, Eastman Kodak and the Grocery Manufac-
turers of America' advocated an outright repeal of Section 211.135
Bacardi, however, supported efforts to narrowly modify the
affected language of Section 211 without a full repeal. 136 In doing
so, Bacardi enlisted House Majority Leader Tom DeLay to push
their version of the Section 211 fix.13 7 Such an enlistment however
did not come cheap, as has been chronicled:
Bacardi has spent heavily during the past several
years to build a relationship with DeLay and other leaders
in both parties, relationships that have repeatedly paid off
when the company flexes its political muscle.
Bacardi gave $20,000 in soft money to Americans for a
Republican Majority PAC in 2001, with another $20,000
128. See id. As of this writing, § 211 remains in effect.
129. See Haggman, supra note 1.
130. John Bresnahan, Rum Punched: DeLay Provision Gone, ROLL CALL, Nov. 10,
2003 [hereinafter Bresnahan, Rum Punched].
131. See Cox, supra note 78 ("Section 211 'is a piece of legislation that should never
have been passed,' says Tom Donahue, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.").
132. See Wes Allison, A Poke at Castro, or a Corporate Payback?, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (South Pinellas Edition), Apr. 29, 2005, at 1A ("'It's a special interest provision
for one company that could jeopardize the international enforcement of trademarks,'
. " (quoting Tom Schatz, President of Citizens Against Government Waste)).
133. See Bresnahan, Rum Punched, supra note 130 (noting that the President of
the National Foreign Trade Council was "very pleased" with the EU's ruling).
134. See Bob Cusak, Flake to Urge Hastert: Reject Delay Legislation, THE HILL, Nov.
5, 2003, at 12.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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going to Texans for a Republican Majority PAC in July
2002. DeLay cut his ties to the two organizations, which he
controlled, after last year's campaign finance legislation
banned soft-money fundraising by Members.
Bacardi also donated $3,000 to DeLay's legal defense
fund following a civil racketeering lawsuit against the
Texas Republican by the Democratic Congressional Cam-
paign Committee in 2000. That case was later dropped,
although it cost DeLay hundreds of thousands of dollars in
legal bills.
And Bacardi helped DeLay pay the bills for events he
hosted at the 2000 Republican National Convention in Phil-
adelphia, as well as supplying the liquor and gifts for
DeLay-run golf tournaments.
138
In 2003 DeLay sought to insert the Bacardi-favored modifica-
tion into a defense authorization bill while it was in conference.139
His effort was unsuccessful, as the Senate Committee Chairman
John Warner objected.14 ° It has been reported that Bacardi's mod-
ification was halted after reports surfaced detailing how "DeLay's
political committees had received $40,000 from [Bacardi] "1
While Section 211 saw neither a repeal nor modification as a
result of DeLay's efforts, Bacardi's $20,000 contribution to
DeLay's Texans for a Republican Majority PAC1 2 did result in a
Texas grand jury handing down a third-degree felony indictment
for making illegal campaign contributions. 43 Perhaps as a result,
no action was taken on Bacardi's bill the following year. At the
time of this writing, the charge against Bacardi is still pending.
Despite the setbacks, Bacardi's political efforts continued.144
By April 2004, Bacardi had enlisted former Senator Connie Mack
(who retired from the Senate in 2000) to push their Section 211
138. John Bresnahan, DeLay Pours It On for Bacardi, ROLL CALL, Oct. 1, 2003
[hereinafter Bresnahan, DeLay Pours It On].
139. See Bresnahan, Rum Punched, supra note 130.
140. See id.
141. Wayne Slater, 2 on Ethics Panel Back Bill to Aid DeLay Donor: Committee
Member Denies Critics' Assertion of Conflict of Interest, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr.
27, 2005, at 2A.
142. See Bresnahan, DeLay Pours it On, supra note 138.
143. See Gold, supra note 12 ("Texas law bans corporate contributions to state
legislative candidates; prosecutors say political organizations used corporate money
to bankroll the campaigns of 22 Republican candidates for the state House of
Representatives in 2002, the year the GOP took control of the state Legislature.").
144. See Elaine Walker, Bacardi Named in Indictment, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 29,
2005, at A2 ("The liquor company has historically been an active contributor to
elected officials, particularly as it sought to build political good will in its long-
running trademark dispute over the rights to Havana Club brand of rum.").
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modification,' though watch-dog groups on Capitol Hill eyed
closely any developments on the Section 211 front. 46 In 2005,
when two ethics committee members, Representative Lamar
Smith of Texas and Representative Melissa Hart of Pennsylvania,
signed on to sponsor the Bacardi-favored modification, it raised
the ire of such groups. 47 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics
observed, "'This particular bill keeps coming up year after year,
and they don't have anybody who will carry the water without
[DeLay] ... Without Tom DeLay, they won't have a bill.""4 That
may be an overstatement, as Bacardi has deep support amongst
Florida lawmakers'49 and Section 211 remains on the books.
Indeed, Bacardi continues to benefit from Section 211. In
August 2006, the PTO denied Cuba's Havana Club renewal regis-
tration by classifying their registration as "canceled/expired."'
Days prior, the OFAC denied "a license necessary to seek renewal
of the trademark registration." 5' This was in reaction to the U.S.
State Department concluding that approving Cubaexport's license
"'would be inconsistent with U.S. policy."" 52 It is expected that
the PTO's decision will be appealed,'53 but in the meantime
Bacardi has already launched its own version of Havana Club rum
in the United States. 4 For now at least, there are two Havana
Club rums on the market - one sold by Cubaexport and another
sold by Bacardi.
145. See John Bresnahan, Heard on the Hill, ROLL CALL, Apr. 26, 2004.
146. See Slater, supra note 141 (noting monitoring by Citizens for Responsibility
and Ethics, a Washington-based nonprofit).
147. See id.
148. Id. (quoting Melanie Sloan of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics).
149. See Allison, supra note 132 (noting the decision to back Bacardi was not "a
tough call" for "a handful of members of Florida's congressional delegation").
150. See Haggman supra note 1; see also U.S. Patent No. 1,031,651 (Aug. 3, 2006).
151. See Kay, supra note 57.
152. See Haggman, supra note 1 (quoting guidance purportedly received from the
U.S. State Department about the matter).
153. See Elaine Walker, Trademarks: Bacardi-Pernod Ricard Rum Fight Will Go
On, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9, 2006, at C1 ("Pernod Ricard said Tuesday it plans to
appeal a decision made last week by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office... ").
154. John Hansell, Havana Club Rum Hops Cuba Trade Embargo, SUN-SENTINEL
(Broward Metro Edition), Aug. 31, 2006, at 6; see also Elaine Walker, Pernod Ricard
Battles Bacardi Over Rum Rights, MIAMi HERALD, Aug. 17, 2006, at Cl (noting, not
surprisingly, Barardi's re-launch has already brought with it a suit alleging that its
Havana Club rum campaign is "false and misleading.").
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IV. COHIBA AND HAVANA CLUB DECISIONS REPRESENT A
CUBAN 'CARvE-OUT' OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
Taken together, the Cohiba and Havana Club trademark dis-
putes can be seen as establishing a separate set of intellectual
property principles for trademark disputes with a Cuban nexus.
In both cases, the decisions rested in large part upon the statutory
language authorizing the U.S. embargo against Castro's Cuba.
That language was strengthened by the latest reiteration of the
U.S. government's commitment to that embargo in the
LIBERTAD Act,' and was viewed as such by the Second Circuit
in its decisions.'56 While the objective of the Act has been viewed
as a form of "congressional insurance of the viability of the Cuban
Embargo for the foreseeable future,"'57 that legislation has become
the underpinnings of an intellectual property 'carve-out' in rela-
tion to Cuba. Combined with Section 211, the 'carve-out' has
served as an insurmountable obstacle for Cuban entities seeking
intellectual property rights in the United States. This perceived
higher-standard for Cuban entities was at the core of the WTO's
condemnation of Section 211,158 and even in the United States,
Section 211's defenders have framed the issue as either being with
or against Fidel Castro.5 9
While, by definition, all statutes are subject to a political envi-
ronment, the emotional undertones by which the relevant statutes
were enacted demonstrate a significant policy choice. They
represent a view that U.S. efforts to undermine the Castro regime
are superior to adjudicating matters on the basis of intellectual
property principles. The Cohiba and Havana Club disputes sug-
gest that the doors to the courthouse have been closed, for all prac-
tical purposes, to Cuban claimants in an intellectual property
action. As such, one must question the effects on intellectual
property law should it become a body of law subject to numerous,
155. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton
Act), Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091
(2000)).
156. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 481 (2d Cir.
2005); Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 124-27 (2d Cir. 2000).
157. See Jospeh Bradica, Havana Club Rum: One Step Back for U.S. International
Trademark Policy, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 147, 156 (2002) (citation omitted).
158. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, §§ 275-281.
159. See Bresnahan, Rum Punched, supra note 130 ("'It's unfortunate when there
isn't sufficient support to step up to the plate and defend American companies from
evil dictators like Fidel Castro, said Jonathan Grella, a DeLay spokesman.").
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burdensome 'carve-outs.' The consequences of such a policy choice
are far ranging, as the ramifications could undermine the purpose
of trademark law, create complications for U.S. corporations that
have invested in building their worldwide brands, and diminish
U.S. credibility on the global stage.
A. Cuban 'Carve-Out' Undermines the Purpose of
Intellectual Property Law
It has been written that "trademarks are widely viewed as
devices that help to reduce information and transportation costs
by allowing customers to estimate the nature and quality of goods
before purchase."Is° Indeed, trademark law "create[s] an incentive
to keep up a good reputation for a predictable quality of goods." 1'
Through these fundamental principles of trademark law, the
trademark itself "comes to embody all of the firm's informational
investments." 62 These predictable qualities deliver significant
value and U.S. brands consistently rank among the most valuable
worldwide. According to Business Week/Interbrand's rankings of
the world's most valuable brands, eight of the top ten are owned
by U.S. entities." How valuable are these brands? In 2005 the
top five brands were estimated to be worth more than $260 mil-
lion."6 That value is reflected whenever a consumer enters a
McDonald's in Madrid, Hong Kong or London and predictably
expects his or her Big Mac to consist of "two all beef patties, spe-
cial sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles, onions on a sesame seed
bun." 6 ' The Cohiba and Havana Club decisions, however, under-
mine this value. Now, there are two Cohiba cigars and two
Havana Club rums, 66 which offer consumers varying degrees of
quality.'67 Interestingly, cigar and rum connoisseurs have noted
160. ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 617 (4th ed. 2006).
161. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
§ 2.4 (4th ed. 1992).
162. See MERGES, supra note 160, at 622.
163. See The 100 Top Brands, Bus. WK., Aug. 1, 2005, at 90-94 [hereinafter 2005
Top 100 Brands] (finding that Coca-Cola, Microsoft, IBM, GE, Intel, Disney,
McDonalds, and Marlboro are among the top ten global brands).
164. Id.
165. Wikipedia, Big Mac, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big-Mac (last visited Feb. 13,
2007) (noting McDonald's famous advertising jingle).
166. Hemlock, supra note 21 ("General Cigar... markets a Dominican cigar whose
label sports a red dot in the 0. Cuba's Cohibas have a gold, black and white band.").
167. See Foulkes, supra note 17; Gary Marx, Trading Shots Over Havana Club
Rum, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 2006, at 10.
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that the most distinguishing characteristic is the uniquely Cuban
influence. '6
While U.S. entities have generally run the table in terms of
valuable brands, the gap is narrowing. In 2003, the Business-
Week /Interbrand's rankings of most valuable brands listed sixty-
two of the top one hundred owners as U.S.-based.'69 Just two
years later, however, that number had dropped to fifty-three.17 °
European-based entities have seen a continued rise in the value of
their brands, and there has been a growing effort to establish an
internationally consistent set of intellectual property principles to
further encourage economic investment.' Recognition of the
value provided by intellectual property is reflected in the World
Intellectual Property Organization's (WIPO) registration applica-
tions. According to WIPO, "[t]he number of PCT international
applications filed per year has grown from 19,809 in 1990 to
135,602 in 2005. " 72 Further,
[a]pplicants from the member states of the European Pat-
ent Convention are the largest group of filers of PCT inter-
national applications, followed by applicants from the
United States of America. The numbers [of] PCT filings
from north east Asian countries are increasing rapidly. Fil-
ings from Japan, the Republic of Korea and China, are
increasing at 22.4%, 24.4% and 46.8% respectively.'73
These international efforts to stream-line trademark law led
to The Madrid Protocol, administered by WIPO. The Madrid Pro-
tocol created a system that:
... offers a trademark owner the possibility to have his
trademark protected in several countries (Members of the
Madrid Union) by simply filing one application directly
with his own national or regional trademark office. An
international mark so registered is equivalent to an appli-
cation or a registration of the same mark effected directly
in each of the countries designated by the applicant. If the
trademark office of a designated country does not refuse
168. See Foulkes, supra note 17; Marx, supra note 167.
169. See The 100 Top Brands, Bus. WK., Aug. 4, 2003, at 72-78.
170. See 2005 Top 100 Brands, supra note 163, at 90-94.
171. See id.; Peter Wilner, The Madrid Protocol: A Voluntary Model for the
Internationalization of Trademark Law, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 17,
19 (2003).
172. WIPO, WIPO Patent Report: Statistics on Worldwide Patent Activities, 21
(2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/patent-
report_2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
173. Id. at 22.
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protection within a specified period, the protection of the
mark is the same as if it had been registered by that
Office.174
The Havana Club controversy has been cited as one obstacle
that for several years caused the United States to hesitate before
ratifying the agreement. ' After "overwhelming support ... in
both the U.S. government and the business community," the U.S.
Senate finally assented to its terms.7 6 As has been observed, this
"translate [d] into access for American trademark owners to global
protection via a system that does not compromise the U.S.'s juris-
diction over its own territory. On a global level, the Protocol pro-
vides a truly viable model for the internationalization of
trademark law."'77 The Madrid Protocol furthered the purpose of
intellectual property law by creating an efficient system to protect
rights and consumers. 8 Based on the use of the system, it has
proven quite successful - on October 27, 2006, WIPO announced
that it had registered its 900,000th mark. '79
Preserving the value of intellectual property requires some
degree of uniformity of enforcement, and the United States' Cuban
'carve-out' runs counter to the international trend to harmonize
intellectual property law. While the Cuban-French joint venture
may have lost its Havana Club registration in the United States,
it still maintains those rights in other parts of the world.8 0
Bacardi's efforts to claim the Havana Club mark outside of the
United States demonstrates how complicated, confusing, and
costly 'carve-outs' to intellectual property law can become."' Cre-
ating a patchwork of intellectual property decisions will further
undermine the consumer protection purposes of trademark law. A
world in which marks may convey varying standards of quality
depending on whether consumers are in Mexico, Canada,
America, Bermuda, South Korea or France will weaken brand
174. WIPO, Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks, http:l!
www.wipo.int/madrid/en/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
175. See Wilner, supra note 171, at 19.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 61.
178. Id.
179. Press Release, WIPO, WIPO Registers 900,000th Mark Under the
International Trademark System, 466 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.
int/edocs/prdocs/en12006/wipopr_2006_466.html.
180. See Louisa Gault, A Rum Punch-Up, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, at 6 (noting that
Pernod Ricard currently sells rum in eighty countries around the world).
181. See id. (Bacardi is currently appealing an adverse decision in Spain, and a
similar action is currently winding through the courts of Canada).
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value and serve as a disincentive to invest in intellectual property.
A trend of country-specific 'carve-outs' would also serve as an
affront to the efforts of many to harmonize the world's intellectual
property.
Through the support of the Madrid Protocol, businesses and
governments have sought to balance the individual rights of
nations to set their own intellectual property laws with the need
for an internationally consistent system.8 2 By choosing the for-
eign policy goal of isolating the Castro regime over the policy
objectives inherent within trademark law, the United States'
Cuban 'carve-out' upsets this balance.
B. The Political Underpinnings of the Cuban 'Carve-
Out' Are Inconsistent with the Role Politics has
Traditionally Played in Intellectual Property Law
Politics has traditionally played an important role in protect-
ing intellectual property rights. Whether it was in the formation
of WIPO, the WTO, the Madrid Protocol, the Paris Convention or
the IAC, the United States has worked with governments around
the world to recognize such rights. The extent to which those
rights would be preserved and protected, while respecting other
nations' sovereign intellectual property laws, required a diplo-
matic dance. Naturally, each nation party negotiated with the
self-interested goal of protecting their own economic base. How-
ever, nations have generally found a way to strike a balance. Such
politicization has also traversed intellectual property law, as the
evergreen subject of trade barriers illustrates. In the 1990's, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)..3 was an impor-
tant issue in the 1992 U.S. Presidential election,' and considera-
tion of whether to grant "Most Favored Nation" trading status
with China sharply divided the U.S. Congress in 1998.185 In each
of these instances, the debate focused on which course of action
best served America's economic interests. The politics surround-
182. See Maria Guerra, The Rocky Road of the U.S. Accession to the Madrid
Protocol: Could This be the Year?, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 525, 528
(2001).
183. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (NAFTA),
Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-
3473 (2000)).
184. Stuart Auerbach, Even on Foreign Front, Debate is Economic, SEATTLE TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1992, at A3.
185. See Ken Fireman, Clinton Backs China - Seeks to Renew 'Most-Favored-
Nation' Trade Status, NEWSDAY, June 4, 1998, at A4.
2007] 481
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:2
ing such debates represented an effort to strike an appropriate
balance between U.S. interests and those of its international
partners.
Similarly, such economic-rooted politics has surrounded the
ongoing debate of protecting U.S. intellectual property rights in
China. The United States continues to seek greater piracy
enforcement in China, and recently the Bush administration's
Treasury Secretary raised this issue directly with his Chinese-
counterpart on an official trip.186 Pressure has also mounted with
Democratic leaders in Congress challenging the Administration's
policies toward China.187 These economic issues extend beyond
the Atlantic, as China's attitude toward intellectual property
rights has also frustrated Europeans."'8 In defending the impor-
tance of the issue, both the European Union and the United States
have cited the increasing costs to their respective economies. s9
Additionally, there is a deep international divide on how the
scope of intellectual property rights should be defined. The debate
continues over whether to extend rights to geographic indications,
which are" . . . like trademarks, only they aren't given to specific
companies or people, but to regions that incorporate a particular
process or material in their production of a product."9 ° As has
been noted, such politics are rooted in economic policy:
The fight for stronger intellectual property protection
has traditionally been led by the developed world, in partic-
ular, the U.S., the E.U. and Japan. But the fight to extend
geographic indication protections has split that alliance.
The E.U., with its centuries of traditional food and drink
specialties, wants more protections. Not only that, it even
wants to "claw back" protected status for scores of products
that have spawned cheap U.S. imitations, like Kraft's "Par-
mesan" cheese, or Wisconsin's "feta" cheese.
The U.S. is horrified by such revisionism. Increased
intellectual property protection is great when it protects
the interests of American corporations, like Hollywood
movie studios, record companies, and the pharmaceutical
186. See Howard Schneider & Nell Henderson, U.S. Trade Gap Grew to New High
in August, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2006, at D1.
187. See id.
188. See Clifford Coonan, EU Preaches Patience on China Piracy, DAILY VARIETY,
Nov. 9, 2006, at 3.
189. See Schneider & Henderson, supra note 186.
190. Andrew Leonard, Globalization and the Blue Agave, http://www.salon.com/
archives/date.html (follow hyperlink to Oct. 2006 archive, then scroll to Oct. 18, 2006
articles) (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
482
CUBAN IP LAW 'CARVE-OUT'
industry. But when it might threaten the profits of Ameri-
can companies, then, gasp, it's evil protectionism and it
must be stopped at all costs. 191
Such debates highlight how the traditional role of economic-
based politics continues to influence the development of intellec-
tual property law by balancing economic interests. The Cohiba
and Havana Club disputes, however, illustrate how a unilateral
'carve-out' undermines this delicate balance. The politics sur-
rounding the Cuban 'carve-out' of intellectual property law is
devoid of a traditional economic policy influence. In fact, there is
no balancing at all. Instead, economics have taken a back-seat to
the foreign policy goal of starving the Castro regime (Cuban
embargo192) and protecting the interests of a single corporation
(Section 21119).
C. Cuban 'Carve-Out' Could Punish U.S. Businesses
More Than Castro
The crux of the United States' foreign policy toward Cuba is
based in large part on punishing the Castro regime. Ironically,
such an intellectual property 'carve-out' could end up punishing
U.S. businesses. Castro himself has threatened to do just that:
"'we'll be able to benefit from the millions [of dollars] that have
been spent [on advertising] some products because it's very easy to
produce them. Here we can produce Palmolive, any toothpaste
.. ,194 In fact, after threatening to produce its own Bacardi rum,
Castro served some Americans who were attending a conference
"a light Cuban rum with the Bacardi label."'95 The cancellation of
Cubaexport's Havana Club mark has caused some to fear retalia-
tion from Cuba, which could prove costly to U.S. businesses:
Now the recent Havana Club denial has raised con-
cerns that Cuba could return the favor by canceling U.S.
trademark registrations based on the communist nation's
own "policy" considerations.
Cuba could, for instance, cancel the trademarks for
Levi's jeans or Heinz ketchup and sell its version in island
stores. Those products could filter into other markets, too,
191. Id.
192. See discussion supra Part II.B.
193. See discussion supra Part III.B.
194. See Mimi Whitefield, Cuba Will Sell Own, 'Better' Bacardi Rum, Castro
Targeting Trademark Battle, MIAMi HERALD, Mar. 20, 2001, at 1A.
195. Radelat, supra note 75.
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harming U.S. companies that have long sought to keep
fakes off store shelves abroad, said the National Foreign
Trade Council.
Such a scenario could force U.S. companies to spend
millions defending trademarks in many different countries
and make the Cuba market ever more difficult to enter if it
ultimately transitions into a market economy. And some
think that day may be sooner rather than later due to
leader Fidel Castro's shaky health. 196
Throughout this long-running battle, others have dismissed
the notion that Cuba would retaliate, suggesting that Cuba
"'would not want to get on the bad side of U.S. business."'197 The
answer to whether or not Cuba will retaliate, or even when, is not
as significant as the question itself. The debate is evidence of a
break-down in intellectual property principles. Rather than pro-
viding a forum to discuss whether the United States correctly
applied trademark law to the merits of these cases, U.S. foreign
policy has short-circuited a deliberative decision. Focusing on
Cuba and Castro is akin to figuring out how to treat a symptom
rather than identifying a cure. Trademark law is designed to do
just that - cure a dispute to ensure that consumers have healthy
choices. If a cure is not identified, we cannot ensure that consum-
ers will benefit from healthy choice. Thus, this Cuban 'carve-out'
must be evaluated more broadly.
The National Foreign Trade Council has proffered, "Arab
countries, for instance, could cancel trademarks for companies
friendly to Israel or Pakistan could do the same with marks owned
by companies working in India."'' 8 Indeed, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce has stated, "'Major corporations have now been drag-
ged into what essentially was a rum war."' 99 Just as trademark
law is intended to protect consumers by affording reliability and
predictability in their purchases, intellectual property law also
provides businesses with a predictable manner in which to ensure
their investments are protected. Carving out exceptions to intel-
lectual property based solely on the right-holder's country of ori-
gin upsets the predictability that is inherently necessary to
protect consumers and inspire investment.
196. Haggman, supra note 1.
197. Carter, supra note 106 (quoting John Kavulich, of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and
Economic Council in New York).
198. Haggman, supra note 1.
199. Fineman, supra note 77 (quoting a source who wished to remain unnamed).
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V. CONCLUSION
In 2001, an editorial writer commenting on the Havana Club
dispute wrote, "At stake is U.S. credibility as a champion of intel-
lectual property rights and the protection of American brand
names worldwide. To a large extent, these problems are the result
of Washington's insistence on isolating Cuba.""' The recent
Cohiba and Havana Club inflection points suggest that those
words are no less true today than when they were originally writ-
ten six years ago. They have been ignored, however, and a new
regime of intellectual property principles has emerged for disputes
involving Cuba.
Despite the international condemnation of Section 211, the
United States remains in violation of the WTO's order,0 1 and
there is no sign that will change anytime soon. While great con-
cern has been expressed by those bracing for a Castro-led retalia-
tion, the Cuban leader's health has kept him on the sideline since
the Havana Club mark was cancelled by the PTO. °2 Additionally,
opposition to such a Cuban 'carve-out' remains virtually universal
in the U.S. business community - but efforts to cure the 'carve-out'
have been largely rhetorical.
Thus, it begs the question: will we see a tipping point or is the
Cuban 'carve-out' the new status-quo? That question may best be
answered by Judge Learned Hand. Hand once stated, "We accept
the verdict of the past until the need for change cries out loudly
enough to force upon us a choice between the comforts of further
inertia and the irksomeness of action."2 3 While it is conceivable
that a post-Castro Cuba will cause a shift in U.S. foreign policy
and negate the basis for the Cuban 'carve-out,' experts have down-
played the chances of a dramatic shift anytime soon.0 4 So what
could change the inertia? Certainly if Cuba launched a retaliatory
trademark war, U.S. businesses may force Capitol Hill's hand.
But what should concern the intellectual property legal commu-
nity is the prospect that a country may impose their own 'carve-
out' against U.S. marks. The cost to U.S. mark-holders could be
immense. Having already established our own set of 'carve-outs,'
200. Editorial, Play Fair on Trade Rights, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 2001, at 22A.
201. See WTO, Summary of the Dispute, supra note 127.
202. See Haggman, supra note 1.
203. Judge Learned Hand, in BARNES & NOBLE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 10 (Robert I.
Fitzhenry ed., 1987).
204. See Carol J. Williams, Cuba-Watchers Still Puzzled Over Country's Future,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006.
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which have been condemned by the international community, the
United States may have diminished credibility to stop such a
move. Ceding a fair and doctrinally-based set of legal principles to
the ever-evolving foreign policy arena is a choice that must be
made only after carefully evaluating the implications. The Cohiba
and Havana Club disputes provide an opportunity to reconsider
whether the 'carve-out' protects intellectual property and is pre-
mised on the principles of fairness. If not, changes should be
made before change 'cries out' too loudly.
